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Binding Interest Arbitration in the




Binding interest arbitration has provided a sensible solution to pub-
lic employee strikes, particularly by police and firefighters, for states and
localities over the past thirty-five years. In April 2003, the California Su-
preme Court reopened the debate on the wisdom of binding interest ar-
bitration for public employees. In County of Riverside v. Superior Court,'
the court reversed a twenty-year trend and struck down a binding inter-
est arbitration statute.
Interest arbitration "refers to the arbitration of disputes arising from
negotiations for new contract terms."' This is different from grievance
arbitration, which "arise[s] from the interpretation or application of an
existing agreement.. " Binding" designates that the arbitrator's decision
results in a legally binding contract.4 Most binding interest arbitration
statutes require "final offer" arbitration, whereby the arbitrator must se-
lect the last offer submitted by one of the parties, usually on an issue-by-
issue basis.' Thus, binding interest arbitration takes the final policy deci-
sions out of the hands of the elected representatives and gives them to a
neutral third party.
1. 66 P.3 d 718 (Cal. 2003).




5. See Senator Robert J. Martin, Fixing the Fiscal Police and Firetrap: A Critique of New Jersey's
Compulsory Interest Arbitration Act, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59, 6o (1993). Because it is beyond this




Currently, about thirty states (or localities therein) have some sort of
interest arbitration statute.6 There are several rationales for allowing in-
terest arbitration in the public sector. For example, it can protect the
public against harmful strikes, while at the same time provide bargaining
leverage to unions incapable of striking effectively.7 However, cities and
counties have argued against binding interest arbitration. 8 The public
employers' argument is that, as opposed to grievance arbitration in which
the arbitrator performs a judicial function by merely interpreting and ap-
plying an existing agreement, in interest arbitration the arbitrator is set-
ting the terms, working conditions, and wages of public employees,
thereby making a policy determination usually entrusted to politically
accountable representatives.9 Public employers also argue that binding
interest arbitration inevitably leads to inflationary wages that have a
harmful impact on their budgets."
Although many state courts have traditionally upheld binding inter-
est arbitration, a notable minority has held it to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority to a private third party." In the past
twenty years, there has been a trend toward endorsing binding interest
arbitration wholeheartedly. 2 The County of Riverside v. Superior Court
decision was the first decision since 198I to strike down a binding interest
arbitration statute, thus ending this trend of total acceptance.
Provided that certain safeguards are in place, the trend of upholding
binding interest arbitration statutes was appropriate. Part I of this Note
will compare cases from the 1990s and 2000S to cases from the 196OS and
6. See Jeffrey Sloan, New Developments in Municipal Law Practice: Municipal Employee Unions
in California, at 581, 594 (PLI Crim. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. Co-ooII, 2001)
(listing state and local interest arbitration statutes).
7. See Grodin, supra note 2, at 679-80.
8. Cities and counties have also argued against grievance arbitration procedures as well, but
courts have been more concerned over interest arbitration and more likely to hold interest arbitration
unconstitutional.
9. See Anthony Modd, Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. 19 v. City of Commerce
City, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Dirp. RESOL. 425, 430 (2001).
Io. See Sloan, supra note 6, at 620.
i i. For early state high courts striking down binding interest arbitration statutory framework, see
Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Locals 1645, 593, 1654, & 2064, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977);
City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35 (S.D. 1975). For early state
high courts upholding binding interest arbitration, see City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's
Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969); State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d
295 (Wyo. 1968).
12. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. I9 v. City of Commerce City, 996
P.2d 133, 138-39 (Colo. 2000); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, 933 P.2d
261, 271 (Okla. 1996); Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Police Dep't Employees Ass'n, 839




I97OS and propose a constitutionally acceptable statutory framework that
addresses the political accountability concerns. Part II will provide back-
ground on the more relevant states' constitutional provisions, statutes,
and cases, examining the early split and analyzing the trend toward ac-
ceptance. Part III will provide an analysis of the current state of the law,
critiquing some of the decisions both upholding and invalidating the dif-
ferent statutory schemes. Part IV will offer a proposal for California and
other jurisdictions that addresses the political accountability concerns,
derived in large part from the more recent cases. This Part will also pro-
pose that direct accountability through voter approval of an arbitration
award is the soundest way to ensure political accountability. This Part is
an especially important model for California cities and counties, because,
absent a state constitutional amendment, statewide binding arbitration is
no longer constitutionally permissible in California.
I. STATE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-DELEGATION
DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO BINDING ARBITRATION
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The most successful challenges to the constitutionality of binding in-
terest arbitration statutes have been under the non-delegation doctrine
of many state constitutions. 3 The states that have addressed this issue
generally have a similar provision in their constitution, that the state leg-
islature "shall not delegate to any special commission, private corpora-
tion or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in
trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function
whatever."' 4 There are also other constitutional provisions that courts
have relied upon.'5 While the text of the particular constitutional provi-
sions are important, the overriding concern, regardless of the text, is that
13. See Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 791; Sioux Falls Firefighters, 234
N.W.2d at 38.
14. Sioux Falls Firefighters, 234 N.W.2d at 36 n.i (quoting PA. CONST. art. III, § 31) See, e.g., Salt
Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 788 n.i; Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 56o, 562 (Pa.
1969); Fire Fighters Local, 437 P.2d at 299. Importantly, the California Supreme Court in County of
Riverside v. Superior Court based its decision in large part on home rule, rather than simply non-
delegation grounds. While both involve delegation, home rule refers to the power of the state to com-
pel a locality to delegate the locality's power, while non-delegation refers to the power of a public en-
tity to delegate its power. Most of the successful challenges have been on strictly non-delegation,
rather than home rule, grounds. See cases cited supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. 59 v. City of Commerce City, 996
P.2d at 135. "Every person having authority to exercise or exercising any public or government duty,
power or function, shall be an elective officer, or one appointed, drawn or designated in accordance
with law by an elective officer or officers....") Id. (quoting COLO. CoNST. art. XXI, § 4).
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any binding arbitration framework allows a private party to make what is
in reality a legislative policy decision.' 6 Regardless of the constitutional
provision, it is the details of the statute that have tended to play the de-
terminative role of whether a court will uphold or strike down binding
interest arbitration under a non-delegation theory.
B. THE EARLY CASES
In the late I96os and 1970s, state courts routinely upheld constitu-
tional challenges to binding interest arbitration. Two early and often-
cited cases are State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946 v. City of Lara-
mie'7 and Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n,'8 which both upheld binding
arbitration statutes. In Fire Fighters Local, the firefighter's union sought
to compel Laramie to comply with the procedures of a binding interest
arbitration statute.' The city defended on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. ° The Wyoming Supreme Court, while not even discuss-
ing the specifics of the statute, upheld it, reasoning that performance of
arbitration is not "performance of a municipal function" within the
meaning of the state constitution.
In Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court upheld the Firefighters' Arbitration Act, a binding arbitration
statute.22 The city challenged the statute on non-delegation grounds.23
The court discussed the provisions of the statute, including the appoint-
ment of a three-person arbitration panel. 24 One arbitrator is to be ap-
pointed by the firefighters' union, one arbitrator is to be appointed by
the municipality, and if the parties cannot agree on the third arbitrator
then the chief justice of the Rhode Island Supreme-Court will appoint
the final member of the panel 5 While not discussed in this early case,
who appoints the arbitrators will, and should, have an impact on the con-
stitutionality of these provisions. Here, however, the court did not ad-
I6. Louis S. Cataland, Binding Arbitration and the Nondelegation Doctrine: Does Ohio's Collec-
tive Bargaining Act Unconstitutionally Delegate Legislative Authority to Administratively Appointed
Arbitrators?, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 83, 88 (i99o).
I7. 437 P.2d at 301 (Wyo. 1968).
18. 256 A.2d at 212.
19. Fire Fighters Local, 437 P.2d at 298.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 300.
22. Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 256 A.2d at 212.
23. The constitutional provision at issue in Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n was Article VI, Sec-
tion 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, which read: "The legislative power, under this Constitution,
shall be vested in two houses, the one to be called the senate, the other the house of representatives;
and both together the general assembly. The concurrence of the two houses shall be necessary to the
enactment of laws." R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
24. Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 256 A.2d at 208.
25. Id.
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dress this aspect. Instead, the court simply declared that "an arbitrator
appointed under the pertinent provisions of the statute is a public officer
and that collectively the three constitute a public board or agency. 2 6 De-
claring the board to be a "public agency" led the court to conclude that
there was not a delegation to a private person, and therefore no constitu-
tional non-delegation problems. 7 This circular reasoning has received se-
vere criticism, even by proponents of binding arbitration. 8 Other courts
around this era also routinely upheld binding arbitration statutes. 9
While many courts upheld these statutes, there were several courts
that invalidated binding arbitration schemes based entirely on non-
delegation grounds.3" In 1962, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
a binding arbitration act ("the Act of June 30, 1947") involving police
and firefighters was not binding on the public, and alternatively, that if it
was binding, it would violate the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 In Greeley
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, the Colorado Supreme Court
invalidated a binding arbitration provision in a city charter amendment
that applied to police officers.32 The court noted that the charter amend-
ment provided that the American Arbitration Association select a single
person who is granted authority to resolve all disputed issues.33 The court
held that the Colorado Constitution prohibited "delegating legislative
power to politically unaccountable persons."34 The court concluded that
the charter amendment unconstitutionally delegated this legislative
power.35
26. Id. at 211.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21
B.C. L. REV. 557,565 (i98o).
29. See Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 325 N.W.2d 350 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982);
City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. i979); Medford
Firefighters Ass'n, Local No. 1431 v. City of Medford, 595 P.2d 1268 (Or. Ct. App. I979); City of Spo-
kane v. Spokane Police Guild, 553 P.2d 1316 (Wash. i976); Town of Arlington v. Bd. of Conciliation &
Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1976); City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y. 1975).
30. See Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Locals 1645, 593, 1654, & 2064, 563 P.2d 786,
789-90 (Utah I977); Greeley Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (Colo. 1976);
City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35, 38 (S.D. 1975); Erie Firefight-
ers Local No. 293 v. Gardner, 178 A.2d 691, 695-96 (Pa. 1962).
3t. Erie Firefighters Local No. 293, 178 A.2d at 695. The constitutional provision at issue here was
typical: "The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private corporation or
association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, prop-
erty or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes or perform any municipal function
whatever." PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 31 (1994).
32. 553 P.2d at 792-93.
33. Id. at 791.




The South Dakota Supreme Court, in City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux
Falls Firefighters, Local 8t4, held that the South Dakota Firemen's and
Policemen's Arbitration Act, a state statute providing for binding arbi-
tration for police and firefighters, was a "clearly unconstitutional" dele-
gation of legislative authority. 6 The court specifically rejected the
reasoning provided by the Wyoming and Rhode Island Supreme
Courts.37 The Utah Supreme Court also invalidated the Firefighter Nego-
tiation Act that applied only to firefighters." The court was concerned
that no statutory standards were in place to control the arbitrator: "Al-
though it is not dispositive of the delegation issue, in this case the legisla-
ture failed to provide any statutory standards in the act or any protection
against arbitrariness, such as, hearings with procedural safeguards, legis-
lative supervision, and judicial review."39 Finally, in i98i the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, in a brief opinion, struck down a city's binding arbi-
tration ordinance on non-delegation grounds in City of Covington v.
Covington Lodge No. i, Fraternal Order of Police.4'
These early cases provide a good preview of what was to happen in
the next two decades. While the majority of the courts were upholding
binding arbitration statutes, there was a significant minority that took a
hard look at the statute and invalidated those statutes that simply gave
too much unfettered power to the arbitrator. The concerns over political
accountability and especially lack of standards would not dissipate. As
more and more states and localities experimented with binding interest
arbitration, more courts faced the political accountability and standards
issues. Until recently, state courts had unanimously upheld binding arbi-
tration statutes over the past twenty years. However, the opinions sug-
gest that the political accountability and standards concerns did not get
lost on either the courts or on the legislatures who were drafting the stat-
utes.
C. A TREND TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE
While most recent state court decisions have overwhelmingly upheld
binding arbitration statutes, this section will begin with an examination
36. City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35,38 (S.D. 1975).
37. Id. at 36-38.
38. Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Locals 1645, 593, 1654, & 2064, 563 P.2d 786, 789-
90 (Utah 1977).
39. Id. at 789.
40. 622 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Ky. i98I). In this case, the previous employment contract between the
police and the city stated that when this contract expired, in the event of a bargaining impasse, binding
arbitration would take place. Id. at 221. The city had passed this previous contract as part of an ordi-
nance. Id. This case was unique in that unlike a blanket city ordinance that applied across the board to
all police and/or firefighter negotiations. this ordinance applied only to this particular situation.
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of three state courts that had previously found binding arbitration uncon-
stitutional but, in a subsequent decision, upheld the rewritten provisions.
Each of these state courts took a different approach.
In the late i98os, the Ohio Supreme Court flip-flopped on the con-
stitutionality of binding interest arbitration. In 1988, in City of Rocky
River v. State Employment Relations Board (Rocky River I), the court
struck down portions of Ohio's Public Employees' Collective Bargaining
Act as unlawfully delegating legislative authority to an arbitrator.' After
several motions for reconsideration, a year later in City of Rocky River v.
State Employment Relations Board (Rocky River IV) the court upheld
the same statute as a constitutional delegation of legislative power." The
Ohio Supreme Court noted that the statute provides "the conciliator
with detailed guidelines under which to proceed," and that these stan-
dards were sufficient for delegation purposes.43 These standards included
consideration of past collectively bargained agreements, the interests and
welfare of the public, and the ability of the public employer to finance
and administer the agreement. ' This case has "at least temporarily, set-
tled a constitutional debate among the justices of the Ohio Supreme
Court."45 It is interesting to note that this decision, while making mention
of the non-delegation issue, did not really address it in full detail, and has
been criticized for that important omission.6 But the court did address
another important factor: standards to control the arbitrator.
Pennsylvania, whose Supreme Court had invalidated a binding in-
terest arbitration statute in Erie Firefighters, approached the non-
delegation problem another way. Rather than a change of justices or re-
drafting the statute, the state adopted a constitutional amendment47 that
41. City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 530 N.E.2d I, 9 (Ohio 1988) (Rocky
River 1).
42. City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd., 539 N.E.2d 103, i19 (Ohio 1989)
(Rocky River IV). One commentator has noted that in this intervening year, one justice had replaced
another justice, and the court agreed to reconsider the motion for rehearing. See Cataland, supra note
16, at 83 n.3.
43. Rocky River IV, 539 N.E.2d at 112.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 83.
46. See Cataland, supra note 16, at 83-84.
47. The constitutional amendment reads:
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision of the Constitution, the
General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels or commis-
sions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of griev-
ances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their
public employers shall be binding upon all parties and shall constitute a mandate to the
head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the
Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which can be
remedied by administrative action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivisions
November 2003]
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permitted binding interest arbitration. The amendment immediately fol-
lowed the constitutional delegation article that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court relied upon in invalidating the statute in Erie Firefighters.
Nonetheless, a city council challenged the Act of June 24, 1968, which
provided for compulsory arbitration to resolve disputes between police
and firefighters and the public employers. 8 The city argued that the stat-
ute did not contain sufficient standards required by the court in other in-
stances of delegated authority.4 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected this argument, reasoning that "[t]o hold that the statute before
us is invalid because it does not contain the standards necessary under
our decisions interpreting Article II [section] i would be to directly con-
tradict the language of the Amendment to Article III [section] 31, and
would violate its obvious intendment as well."5 Thus, the placement of
authorization for binding arbitration directly into a state constitution vir-
tually eliminates any successful challenges to the statute.
Colorado, whose Supreme Court rejected a binding arbitration stat-
ute in Greeley Police Union, was once again faced with the issue in Fra-
ternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce
City.' This case exemplifies the modern trend with a well-reasoned and
analyzed opinion that addressed the political accountability issue. Com-
merce City challenged a charter amendment that established a detailed
binding arbitration framework. 2 The amendment required the City
Council to create a permanent panel of at least three arbitrators. 3 The
Council was allowed to add and remove arbitrators from the panel at any
time. 4 In addition, the amendment required the arbitrator to consider
seven enumerated factors and issue a written decision.5 The seven fac-
tors, which are typical of the standards set out by many state and local
legislatures and demanded by some courts, are: (i) the interests and wel-
fare of the public and the financial ability of the City to bear the costs in-
volved; (2) the lawful authority of the City; (3) stipulations of the parties;
(4) comparison of the compensation, benefits, hours, and other terms or
conditions of employment of the members of the police department in-
or of the Commonwealth, with respect to matters which require legislative action, to take
the action necessary to carry out such findings.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
48. Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560, 561 (Pa. 1969).
49. Id. at 562-63.
50. Id. at 563.
51. Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce City, 996 P.2d I33,
133-34 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
52. Id. at 135.
53. Id. at 134.
54- Id.
55. Id. at 134-35.
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volved with other police department members performing similar ser-
vices in public employment in comparable communities; (5) the cost of
living; (6) any claims of failure of a party to bargain in good faith pursu-
ant to section 21.7(c); and (7) other similar standards recognized in the
resolution of interest disputes. 7 Finally, the amendment provided for
limited judicial review of the arbitrator's award."
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the charter amendment, stat-
ing that the case was consistent with Greeley Police Union.59 The court
reasoned that in Greeley Police Union, the court made clear that the
Colorado Constitution prohibited delegation of legislative power to "po-
litically unaccountable" persons." Here, the court held that, by requiring
the City Council to create the arbitration panel and by allowing the City
Council to remove persons from the arbitration panel, the panel was po-
litically accountable. 6' Furthermore, the court held that the amendment
provided sufficient standards and safeguards to guide the arbitrator's de-
cislon.
Over the past decade, other states have also dealt with constitutional
non-delegation challenges to binding interest arbitration statutes. The
cases of Oklahoma and Alaska are illustrative of the new approach legis-
latures are taking. Instead of unaccountable arbitrators with absolute
discretion, these statutes address political accountability concerns and
constrain arbitrator discretion.
In 1971, the Oklahoma Legislature passed the Fire and Police Arbi-
tration Act (the "Act"), where the right of police and firefighters to
strike was withheld.63 However, the Act only provided for non-binding
interest arbitration.64 The Act was amended in 1985 and I995 to provide
for binding interest arbitration. 6' The 1995 amendment also provided a
unique process: If the arbitrators did not choose the city council's best
offer, the city council could call a special election and submit the two
proposals to a vote of the people.66 The citizens of the affected municipal-
57. Id. at 135 n.5.
58. Id. at 135.
59. Id. at 136.
60. Id.
6i. Id. at 137.
62. Id. at 138-39.






ity could, in essence, have the final say as to whether to ratify or reject
the collective bargaining agreement.
67
In 1996, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the Act despite nu-
merous constitutional challenges, including non-delegation, in Fraternal
Order of Police, Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw.6' The court compared
the Oklahoma statute to other state binding arbitration statutes that
were held constitutional. The Oklahoma court found the reasoning of the
other state courts persuasive that the "delegation of authority to an arbi-
trator was permissible because there were sufficient guidelines and stan-
dards set forth in the legislation." ' The court pointed out that here, the
Act "requires that the arbitrators give weight to factors such as a com-
parison of wages and benefits with prevailing wage rates, interest and
welfare of the public and revenues available to the municipality." 0 The
court reasoned that similar "guidelines were noted by the Alaska Court
in approving their statute for binding interest arbitration."'" (This case is
discussed immediately below.) Therefore, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
upheld the Act against the political accountability challenge because the
"delegation of power is accompanied by sufficient guidelines."7"
Surprisingly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not analyze the po-
litical accountability aspect of the municipality allowing the submission
of final offers to the voters if the municipality's offer is not chosen. The
court merely stated that "the ultimate decision resides with either the city
council or the people themselves. 73 This lack of analysis may be because
direct voter approval of the offer makes the arbitration offer per se po-
litically accountable; but it is more likely because the court never reached
this issue, since it held that the statute contained sufficient standards and
guidelines. In fact, the municipalities in Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge
No. 165 v. City of Choctaw argued against the direct vote provision, stat-
ing that it took away the city's power to tax and that it was an illegal use
of the initiative and referendum process.7" The court rejected all of these
contentions.75
In 1975, Anchorage, Alaska enacted a comprehensive labor ordi-
nance that included a binding arbitration provision for police, fire per-
67. Id. at 269.
68. Id. at 263.
69. Id. at 267.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 268.
72. Id.
73. Id.




sonnel, and emergency medical service workers. 6 In 1989, Anchorage,
while in contract talks with local police and firefighters, filed suit claim-
ing that the binding arbitration provision was unconstitutional.77 Three
years later, the Supreme Court of Alaska in Anchorage Police Depart-
ment heard the case and addressed both the issues of political account-
ability and sufficient standards.7 9 The court upheld the ordinance under
both challenges. 8°
Unlike Colorado's case in Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado
Lodge No. 19 v. City of Commerce City, where the City Council chose
the list of arbitrators, here the American Arbitration Association sup-
plied the list.8' That was not determinative for the Alaska high court.
First, the court, citing language used by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated that "we are less concerned with the labels placed
on arbitrators as public or private, as politically accountable or inde-
pendent, than we are with the totality of the protection against arbitrari-
ness provided in the statutory scheme. '' "2 Unlike the South Dakota and
Utah courts, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the delegation of legis-
lative power to an arbitrator was not per se unconstitutional. 83
Here, the court held that the statute contained sufficient protections
against arbitrariness. First, the court pointed out that the arbitration
must be conducted according to published rules by the American Arbi-
tration Association. 84 Second, while the American Arbitration Associa-
tion provides the list of arbitrators, the choice of the arbitrator must be
mutually agreed to by the parties.85 Third, the arbitrator must conduct a
hearing and produce a written decision with findings of fact concerning
the specific issues in question.86 Finally, the written decision is "subject to
76. Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Dep't of Employees Ass'n, 839 P.2d io8o, 1081-82
(Alaska 1992).
77. Id. at lO83.
79. The court framed the challenges this way: "The Municipality argues that the Code's binding
interest arbitration provisions, delegating legislative authority to a politically unaccountable arbitrator,
violate the Alaska Constitution. Alternatively, the Municipality contends that the Code is unconstitu-
tional because its provisions fail to provide standards to guide the arbitrator." Id.
8o. Id. at io85, IO89.
8I. Id. at io82 n.5.
82. Id. at iO84 (quoting Town of Arlington v. Bd. of Conciliation & Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914,
920 (Mass. 1976)).
83. Id. at lo85.
84. Id. at os88.




judicial review for abuse of discretion, fraud, or misconduct on the part
of the arbitrator.
'' s8
Another important factor was the list of standards that has become
common in modern binding interest arbitration statutes. The statute pro-
vided that the fact-finder is to consider "workload, productivity, eco-
nomic feasibility, cost of living, the parties' bargaining history, relevant
market comparisons in thepublic sector, and relevant market compari-
sons in the private sector." After an exhaustive analysis of the statute,
the court concluded that "[i]n light of the elaborate and detailed struc-
ture which guides the arbitrator's decisions and guards against arbitrary
action we conclude that the Code's delegation of legislative authority isconstitutional. ,,89
D. THE TREND ENDS IN CALIFORNIA
The trend of courts upholding binding arbitration statutes involving
public employees and public entities ended in April 2003, when the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court invalidated the state's binding interest arbitration
statute.90 Until 2001, California had been without a state-wide binding in-
terest arbitration statute. Twenty-one California localities, however, had
implemented various forms of binding arbitration. 9' During the 1999-
2000 session, the California Legislature enacted into law Senate Bill 402,
entitled "Arbitration of Firefighter and Law Enforcement Officer Labor
Disputes," which added sections 1299 et seq. to the California Code of
Civil Procedure. 92 Under Senate Bill 402, a labor union representing pub-
lic safety employees can declare an impasse in the negotiations and re-
quire a local agency to submit unresolved economic issues to binding
arbitration. 93 Each party then chooses an arbitrator, who together choose
a third arbitrator.94 The arbitration panel then chooses between each
side's last best offer, based on an enumerated list of factors.95 Interest-
87. Id. at io88.
88. Id. at io82 n.5.
89. Id. at IO89.
9
o
. County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d 718, 721 (Cal. 2003).
9
i
. Sloan, supra note 6, at 605.
92. County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d at 721.
93. Id. at 722. For a discussion on the distinction between economic and noneconomic issues, see
infra note 145.
94. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1299.4 to .6 (West 1982)).
95. Id. The factors included: the interest and welfare of the public; the financial condition of the
employer and its ability to meet the costs of the award; the availability and sources of funds to defray
the cost of any changes in matters within the scope of arbitration; comparison of wages, hours, and
other terms and condition of employment of other employees performing similar services in similar
employment; the average consumer prices for goods and services; particular requirements of employ-
ment, including, but not limited to, mental, physical, and educational qualifications, job training and
skills, and hazards of employment; and changes in any of the foregoing that are traditionally taken into
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ingly, Senate Bill 402 only applied to any local agency or any entity act-
ing as an agent of a local agency, but did not apply to the State of Cali-
fornia even acting as such an agent. 6 Therefore, the California Highway
Patrol, among others, were not covered by this statute.
The California Supreme Court invalidated Senate Bill 402 as violat-
ing the California Constitution. The court, however, invalidated the law
on "home rule" grounds, not under the non-delegation doctrine.' The
court held that the legislature did not have power to legislate in this area
because compensation of county public employees is not a statewide
concern, and therefore the power to compensate county employees is
within the sole powers of counties (and presumably cities for city em-
ployees).' 8 The court specifically did not address whether a county (or
city or the state for its own employees) could enact a binding arbitration
statute on matters it controlled:
At the outset, we emphasize that the issue is not whether a county may
voluntarily submit compensation issues to arbitration, i.e., whether the
county may delegate its own authority, but whether the Legislature
may compel a county to submit to arbitration involuntarily. The issues
involves the division of authority between the state and county, not
what the county may itself do.'
This is an important distinction, because it leaves open the possibil-
ity that cities, counties, and the state may enact binding arbitration pro-
cedures involving public employees whose compensation they control.
For example, cities, counties, and even the state could enact the proposal
below for the workers they each employ.
Although the court's opinion can be read as forbidding any state leg-
islative requirement of binding arbitration onto localities as an impermis-
sible infringement on "home rule," the State could attempt a state-wide
system based on a direct accountability system, where the locality has the
consideration in the determination of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § i299.6(c).
96. County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d at 722 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1299.3(c)
(West I982)).
97. See id. at 723-27. See also cases cited supra note 14 for distinction between home rule and
non-delegation.
98. See id. at 725-26. It is interesting to note that in Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, the
Utah Supreme Court, which involved a similar constitutional provision at issue in County of Riverside
v. Superior Court, held that binding arbitration was not an infringement on home rule; it did not
impermissibly interfere with a municipal function because police and firefighter compensation was a
statewide concern. Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Locals 1654, 593, 1654, & 2064, 563
P.2d at 789. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court held that the statute, as written, violated the non-
delegation doctrine. Id. at 789-90.
99. County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d at 722. See also id. at 726 ("Whether the
county may delegate its own authority is irrelevant here.... As noted, the issue involves the distribu-
tion of authority between county and state, not what the county itself may do.").
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ultimate choice of sending the decision to the voters. The court stated
that the reason Senate Bill 402 fails to pass constitutional muster was be-
cause "the county's governing body does not retain ultimate power."''
The State could argue that an arbitration statute (as proposed below)
that allows the locality to take to the voters any adverse arbitration
award does provide that locality's governing body with the "ultimate
power" over the decision. Drafting a statute with more political account-
ability on the local level may be a way to overcome County of Riverside
v. Superior Court's concerns.
As this section demonstrates, for almost twenty years state courts
routinely upheld binding interest arbitration statutes as an appropriate
constitutional means for resolving public labor disputes. However, legis-
latures have also been drafting more careful statutes, which may be the
reason why the trend has been towards complete acceptance. The next
Part will address whether this trend is appropriate in light of the still lin-
gering constitutional issues.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The prior trend in favor of binding interest arbitration in certain
parts of the public sector was appropriate, provided that certain re-
quirements are met. First, there are several positive aspects that should
continue to play a role in future binding interest arbitration statutes. The
most important aspects are the acknowledgment of the unique "no
strike" rules that apply to police and firefighters, the provisions that ad-
dress political accountability, and the demand for sufficient standards.
However, the trend was not without faults. Some state courts have up-
held binding arbitration statutes with insufficient protections, while oth-
ers have struck down adequate statutes. This Part will examine the
current state of the law, looking at both the positive aspects of the last
thirty-five years and the flaws in some statutes and court decisions.
A. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE TREND
As an initial matter, many of the state and local statutes apply only
to police and fire services. This is because most states outlaw strikes by
police and firefighters,' °' otherwise known as essential services, because
of the detrimental impact a strike of that nature would have on the com-
munities.' On the other hand, the right of public employees to collec-
1o. Id. at 725.
Ioi. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, 933 P.2d 261, 265
(Okla. 1996).
102. See Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 155 (1987).
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tively bargain has increased substantially over the past forty years. ' 3
Some commentators have suggested that "[t]he right to bargain collec-
tively has been so connected with the right to strike in this country that
legitimate questions arise as to whether genuine collective bargaining can
occur without the right to strike.' ' .4 This creates a problem for police and
firefighter unions: Without binding interest arbitration, they have the
right to bargain collectively, but do not have direct striking pressure to
place on the public employer.
The courts have not been oblivious to this problem. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 165 v. City of
Choctaw noted this dilemma in quoting the Oregon Supreme Court,
which stated that "binding arbitration is essentially a quid pro quo for the
prohibition of strikes by firemen. Together, these statutes protect the
public from interruption of essential health and safety services while rec-
ognizing the employees' right to engage in meaningful collective bargain-
ing."'
05
Indeed, in the absence of the right to strike, interest arbitration is a
strong substitute to make collective bargaining effective. o6 The courts are
correct to note this unique feature of binding interest arbitration. It pro-
vides the police and firefighters unions with a pressure similar to that of a
strike on the public employer, while at the same time protecting the
health and safety of the community.'"
Another positive aspect has been the discussion of the need for po-
litical accountability.' °8 What separates interest arbitration with other
private forms of arbitration is the fact that the arbitrator, never an
elected representative, is making legislative policy decisions. I" In order
to be truly accountable to the citizens, arbitrators who are making these
legislative decisions need to have some connection to the elected repre-
sentatives.
However, having an arbitrator who is politically accountable raises
certain issues if the arbitrator is accountable to the local entity and other
issues if the arbitrator is accountable to the state. For example, an arbi-
trator may be made "politically accountable" to the local city or county
103. See Marcus R. Widenor, Public Sector Bargaining in Oregon: The Enactment of the PECBA, 8
LERC MONOGRAPH SER. 1, 6 (1989).
104. Anderson & Krause, supra note 102, at 153.
105. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, 933 P.2d at 267 (quoting Med-
ford Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Medford, 595 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Or. 1979)).
io6. Anderson & Krause, supra note 102, at 155.
107. Id. at 156.
io8. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce City, 996
P.2d 133, 137-38 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
io9. See Grodin, supra note 2, at 68I.
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by appointment by the city council, as was the case in Fraternal Order of
Police, Colorado Lodge No. 19 v. City of Commerce City. If an arbitrator
is made politically accountable to the local electorate, which can be con-
sidered a "party" in the arbitration proceeding, then the arbitrator may
not be seen as neutral."' In addition, "to the extent that the arbitrator's
constituency is the same as that of the legislative body that would other-
wise exercise authority over the policy questions posed, the process be-
comes redundant."'' I
On the other hand, the state legislature may form a statewide arbi-
tration panel, so that the arbitrators are politically accountable to elected
representatives, albeit at the state level. This poses a problem of the state
infringing on local autonomy."' The state is in essence indirectly dictating
to the localities how to set police and firefighter wages. This is what
doomed the California statute, as there were specific constitutional pro-
visions that protected cities and counties "home rule" in this area."3
Statewide legislation, therefore, may run into two problems. First, the
state constitution may not permit it. Second, even if statewide binding in-
terest arbitration that applies to cities and counties is constitutionally ac-
ceptable, it ultimately removes the decisions from the citizens of the
localities and places those decisions with the representatives of the state.
This could anger citizens who would in effect be told by the state how
much the locality needs to budget for its police and fire protection.
Legislatures have begun to recognize the concerns raised by scholars
and the courts about political accountability. It is important to point out
that not every court that has upheld a binding interest arbitration statute
has done so on political accountability grounds. For example, the statute
upheld in Anchorage Police Department called for the American Arbitra-
tion Association to provide a list of arbitrators.' The Colorado Supreme
Court in Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. 19 v. City of
Commerce City, on the other hand, stated that a previous statute that had
been struck down suffered from a lack of political accountability due to
iso. Id. at 693.
iii. Id.
r 12. id. at 694.
113. In County of Riverside v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that the binding
interest arbitration statute violated two home rule provisions of the California Constitution. 66 P.3d
718, 730-31 (Cal. 2003). Article XI, Section i(b) stated that a county's "governing body shall provide
for the ... compensation.., of employees." CAL. CONST. art. XI, § I(b). Article XI, Section i i(a) pro-
vides: "The Legislature may not delegate to a private person or body power to make, control, appro-
priate, supervise, or interfere with county or municipal corporation improvements, money, or
property, or to levy taxes or assessments, or perform municipal functions." Id. at i i(a).
114. Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Dep't Employees Ass'n, 839 P.2d Io8o, IO82 n.5
(Alaska 1992).
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the fact that the American Arbitration Association, "an independent or-
ganization with no political accountability," submitted the list."5
One state court may see a political accountability problem where
another court does not. The point is, however, that courts are properly
considering this aspect of the non-delegation doctrine. Instead of the
bright-line rules of Sioux Falls Firefighters, where no delegation to an ar-
bitrator is proper, no matter the form, today there is Fraternal Order of
Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce City, where the
court will examine the statute in actual application to determine if there
are sufficient legislative safeguards.
The legislatures and courts are addressing the need for some politi-
cal accountability, in two distinct ways. The first way is to make the arbi-
trator politically accountable, while the other alternative is to make the
arbitrator's award politically accountable.
Legislative bodies in Colorado and Nebraska, for example, seek po-
litical accountability through the arbitrator. In Colorado, the city charter
amendment sought to have the arbitrator directly accountable to the city
council. The city council creates a permanent panel of arbitrators, and
has the authority to add and remove arbitrators from the panel at any
time." 6 This is to ensure that the arbitrators themselves are subject to di-
rect control from elected representatives. Nebraska, on the other hand,
has a "politically accountable" administrative agency to resolve bargain-
ing impasses."7 This is similar to other states whose arbitrators, rather
than supplied by a list from the American Arbitration Association, are
supplied by an administrative agency." 8 These statutes, have direct politi-
cal control over the arbitrator, but not necessarily the award. If the
award is upsetting to the elected body, then it will be the arbitrator who
is subject to dismissal.
On the other hand, Oklahoma's Fire and Police Arbitration Act
represents an attempt to get political accountability over the award itself.
The concern is not who is actually arbitrating, but what is the end result.
If the city's offer is not selected, the city can request a direct voter ap-
proval of the award."9 In this way, the legislature seeks to give control
over the policy decision to the citizens. While this new type of political
accountability has not been extensively addressed by commentators, in
I 15. Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce City, 996 P.zd at i35-
36.
1i6. Id. at 134.
I I7. Craver, supra note 28, at 565.
i is. See Cataland, supra note i6, at 99 n.87.
I i9. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. i65 v. City of Choctaw, 933 P.2d 261, 264 (Okla. 1996).
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Part IV this Note will argue that this is a more effective response to the
political accountability issue.
The third positive aspect has been the demand of courts to require
enumerated standards on which the arbitrator is to base his or her deci-
sion. To begin with, even some of public employers acknowledge that
binding interest arbitration is not per se unconstitutional. ' Rather, they
argue that without standards and guidelines binding interest arbitration
is an invalid delegation of authority. For example, in Anchorage Police
Department, the city argued that "our problem is not with binding inter-
est arbitration as a concept.... Our problem is with the way it has been
done with this ordinance. The ordinance simply does not provide the
necessary standards and safeguards to make that delegation of authority
valid .....
An excellent example of the courts requiring standards was the deci-
sion by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in City of Biddeford v. Bid-
deford Teacher's Ass'n.'22 The case involved the validity of the binding
arbitration provision of the Municipal Employees Labor Relations Law,
which applied to all public employees, but in this case was being invoked
by teachers.' 3 The court first held that binding interest arbitration was
not a per se violation of the non-delegation doctrine of the state constitu-
tion.'24 However, the court closely scrutinized the statute and found that
adequate standards did not exist. 5 The court noted that "[t]his Act-
unlike those in some other states-does not provide that the arbitrators'
award is to be subject to existing statutory restrictions.,126
Although an earlier case, Biddeford Teacher's Ass'n provides an ex-
cellent analysis of the need for standards. Standards parallel political ac-
countability, as the Maine court noted that the "arbitrators are not public
officials and are not required to answer to the electorate or to the elected
representatives of the electorate.', 27 In the last decade, the necessity of
standards have been an important factor for courts in upholding these
statutes.
120. Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Dep't Employees Ass'n, 839 P.2d lo8o, lO85 n.9
(Alaska 1992).
121. Id.
122. 304 A.2d 387, 403 (Me. 1973).
123. Id. at 389-o.
124. Id. at 398.
125. Id. at 402-03.
126. Id. at 402.
127. Id.
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B. CRITIQUE OF DECISIONS
While the more recent decisions have demonstrated a positive step
taken by legislatures and the courts in drafting and interpreting binding
interest arbitration statutes, there have been problematic decisions over
the years. The purpose of this analysis is to show that the means are im-
portant in achieving the end of a constitutionally acceptable statutory
framework.
My first critique is addressed to state legislatures. Generally, binding
interest arbitration statutes are tailored to a narrow sector of public em-
ployees, usually police and firefighters."' However, some states have
provided binding interest arbitration to all public employees, regardless
of whether they perform "essential services" or not.'29 This is a mistake,
for it broadens the use of this unique procedure to public employees who
have other recourses.
As discussed above, courts and commentators view binding interest
arbitration as a replacement for the right to strike and to make collective
bargaining rights effective.3 While strikes are certainly disruptive, the
bargaining is still between public employees and the politically account-
able public employer. Binding interest arbitration, which involves a pri-
vate individual making legislative decisions, should only be used for
those service providers, such as police and firefighters, that the commu-
nity simply cannot afford to go on strike. It should not be used to enable
the public employer to abdicate completely its role determining the com-
pensation of most of its employees.'3 ' Although it is tempting to use bind-
ing interest arbitration for all public employee labor disputes, it should
not be a substitute for groups of employees who have the option to
strike.
My second critique is addressed to state judiciaries. It is imperative
that courts analyze the statutes to make sure the arbitrators are politi-
128. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. II § 51-Ioi (West 1994) (applying to police and firefighters);
Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce City, 996 P.2d 133, 135 (Colo.
2000) (citing city charter amendment applying to police officers).
129. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 961-974 (West 1964 & Supp. 2002) (applying to all public
employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ t79A.oi-A.3o (applying to all public employees).
130. See supra notes Ioi-o8 and accompanying text.
131. Conceivably, the arbitrator under an "all public employee" scheme could end up setting most
of the public employees' salaries. For example, if bargaining units of police, firefighters, administrative
workers, parks and recreation workers, etc., all cannot come to an agreement, then the arbitrator
would have to decide the compensation for each of the employee groups. While this may be consid-
ered a "worse case scenario," under an all employee system, the possibility grows that an arbitrator
will have to decide a disproportionate amount of compensation levels. While binding interest arbitra-
tion laws are positive when drafted in a particular manner, they should not become a substitute for the
elected representatives in every case.
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cally accountable and are guided by enumerated standards. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court's decision in Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, is
an example of an opinion that lacks proper analysis. Rather than critique
this opinion, which has been done by many commentators,'32 I will point
out the danger in this type of decision. The court held that arbitrators
when acting in their binding interest capacity were in reality public offi-
cials. 33
This type of semantic manipulation does not justify the end result of
a constitutionally acceptable statutory framework. Courts that engage in
this type of ends-justifying reasoning simply do not examine the statute
at all, nor do they determine if the arbitrators are constrained by any po-
litical accountability or enumerated standards. This type of poor judicial
review allows legislatures to draft broad proposals that could leave arbi-
trators unchecked. Fortunately, Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n is an
aberration, rather than a trend. It is important that courts engage in
meaningful judicial review, so not as to let wholly unaccountable private
parties make legislative policy decisions.
III. "MODEL STATUTE" PROPOSAL
While a binding interest arbitration statute may seem like a complex
way to resolve labor disputes, it is the best solution for dealing with po-
lice and firefighter labor impasses. The State of California and its cities
and counties should do likewise. The alternatives are not desirable. Pub-
lic employers will argue that binding interest arbitration is not necessary,
that police and firefighters already have been given a "fair shake" by the
public employer and that they do not need this unnecessary weapon.'34
However, considering that so many states and localities have opted to
create such a system, clearly there is a feeling that police and firefighters
are not given a "fair shake." Without this system, police and firefighters
would have to accept whatever the public employer offered.
California now stands at a crossroads. For over thirty-five years,
public entities have experimented with binding interest arbitration. Cali-
fornia attempted to join this group, but a statewide attempt to impose
binding interest arbitration on cities and counties has failed. The easiest
solution would be to follow Pennsylvania's lead and enact a constitu-
tional amendment that allows for binding interest arbitration.'35 How-
ever, that would not address the fundamental problems and concerns
about the role of the arbitrator. California and its cities and counties
132. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 28, at 565.
133. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206, 209 (R.I. I969).
134. See Sloan, supra note 6.
135. See PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
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have a great opportunity to pass statutes that are not just constitutionally
acceptable but that also address political accountability and arbitration
standards in an ideal manner. Having examined the positive and negative
aspects of binding interest arbitration, I propose a statute that the State,
cities, and counties of California can adopt toward employees whom they
control that includes the best practices of the last thirty-five years. The
statute I propose should only apply to essential services such as police
and firefighters, should include direct political accountability, and should
contain sufficient standards to constrain the arbitrator. This proposal
could be adopted statewide or on a local basis.
A. ONLY FOR "ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEES"
The binding interest arbitration statute or ordinance should only be
for essential employees, which are typically police and firefighter per-
sonnel. As discussed above, this is because of the unique nature of their
work: they perform services that are absolutely essential to health and
safety, but at the same time they are not allowed to strike. Other em-
ployees may be found to be essential also.36 Whatever the classification,
it should not be a blanket right to binding interest arbitration for every
public employee.
B. DIRECT POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The statute or ordinance should address the political accountability
problem through a direct voter approval of the arbitration awards.
If direct voter approval is not desired, then other political account-
ability measures must be enacted. The arbitrators themselves could be
made accountable to elected representatives. On the political account-
ability side, statutes such as that involved in Fraternal Order of Police,
Colorado Lodge No. 165 v. City of Commerce City1' are much more ap-
pealing than the statute involved in Anchorage Police Department.' It is
important that the elected representatives play a role in who will be on
the arbitration board. Therefore, if a state or locality does not adopt the
direct elections approach, there are a number of alternatives to place po-
litical accountability on the arbitrator. For example,- a state or locality
can devise a public arbitration agency similar to Nebraska.'39 Or, a state
136. See Grodin, supra note 2, at 679 n.4 (noting that some states have classified prison guards,
hospital employees, public transportation workers, and port authority employees as under this um-
brella).
137. Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i v. City of Commerce City, 996 P.2d 133,
133-35 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
138. Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Dep't Employees Ass'n, 839 P.2d lo8o, io8i-83
(Alaska 1992).
139. See Cataland, supra note 16, at 99 n.87.
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or locality can allow the legislature or city council to play a direct over-
sight role, such as the city charter in Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado
Lodge No. 19 v. City of Commerce City. Either way, the elected body is
placing some political restraints on the arbitrators themselves.
The real issue that concerns citizens is what the arbitrator is actually
awarding. It is the award of compensation that will directly affect the citi-
zens, possibly either through cuts in other services, decrease in overall
spending, or increased taxes. Cities and counties of California should
look to Oklahoma's unique solution to this problem. If the city's final of-
fer is not chosen by the arbitrator, the city council can request the arbi-
tration award to be voted on by the citizens.'40 In that way, direct political
accountability is realized.
As discussed above, commentators have pointed out some of the
problems with political accountability of the arbitrator.'4 ' The arbitrator,
if responsive to the elected officials, is in effect responsive to one of the
parties who cannot resolve the labor dispute. Conceptually, the same ar-
gument can be applied to the citizens who vote, who are supposed to be
represented by the elected officials.
On the other hand, when the citizens get to directly vote on the arbi-
tration award, that provides direct political accountability. There may be
factors that are skewing the bargaining process, such as elected represen-
tatives holding a grudge against the bargaining agents or other factors
that may come into play during negotiations. But it is the citizens' check-
book that the parties are negotiating over. If the citizens want to give the
police and firefighters a substantial raise, then they can voice themselves
at the polls. Therefore, California and its cities and counties should adopt
a statutory scheme similar to Oklahoma.'42
C. SUFFICIENT STANDARDS
The statute or ordinance should contain sufficient standards to regu-
late arbitrator discretion. The legislatures and the courts have handled
these safeguards convincingly and thoroughly. Many courts that have
upheld binding interest arbitration statutes have discussed the standards
140. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 51-108 (West Supp. 2003); see also Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, 933 P.2d 261, 263 (Okla. 1996) .
141. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
142. Oklahoma Statutes, title i i, section 51-1o8 reads in pertinent part:
Each arbitration statement shall also include a final offer on each unresolved issue....
Within seven (7) days after the conclusion of the hearing, a majority of the arbitration
board members shall select one of the two last best offers as the contract of the parties....
If the city's last best offer is not selected by the arbitration board, that party may submit the
offers which the parties submitted to the arbitration board to the voters of the municipality
for their selection by requesting a special election for that purpose.
OKLA. STAT. tit It, § 51-108 (1994).
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that are in place to constrain the arbitrator's discretion.'4 3 "Standards"
encompasses three distinct areas: requirement of a written decision by
the arbitrator, enumerated criteria in the statute, and judicial review of
the award.
First, the cities, counties, or State of California should require the
arbitrator to issue a written opinion addressing each issue.'" It is impor-
tant to note that this is related to judicial review in that, for the court to
have meaningful judicial review, it needs to have some evidence of what
and how the arbitrator came to his or her decision.
This written decision will be just as important in areas that have a
referendum on the award as those that do not. Where there is a referen-
dum, the written decision will provide voters with reasons why the award
was made. Where there is no referendum, a written decision is an essen-
tial part of the restraint on arbitrator discretion (see judicial review dis-
cussion below). Therefore, a written decision on each issue needs to be a
part of any statute.'
45
Second, the statute or ordinance needs to contain a list of standards
that the arbitrator must consider. 46 There are a variety of standards that
legislatures have drafted,' 47 but California should adopt the comprehen-
sive list of factors provided by the Michigan statute:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interest and welfare of the public and the financial ability of
the unit of government to meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of
the employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages,
143. See Anderson & Krause, supra note io2, at 158-59.
144. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i9 v. City of Commerce City, 996
P.2d 133, 35 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
145. "Issue" refers to the bargaining issues being decided by the arbitrator. These fall into two
categories: economic and non-economic issues. For example, wage increases is an economic "issue,"
while working conditions would be a "non-economic" issue. See Sloan, supra note 6, at 603-04. There-
fore, under my proposal, and under many current state statutes, the arbitrator would make a separate
written finding on his or her award of wages, a separate written decision on his or her decision on
working conditions, and thereon.
146. This Note will not address the debate on what factors should be considered and what factors
should not be considered. For example, one critique is that factors such as the public employer's ability
to pay should be given more weight than others. See Martin, supra note 5, at 63. Even though there is
an agreement on standards, there is disagreement and a lot of commentary on what should be included
and what weight these factors should be given. Id.
147. The most significant and controversial factor is "comparability," which requires a "compari-
son of the overall compensation of the employees involved in the dispute with the overall compensa-
tion of comparable employees performing similar work in both private and public employment in a
particular community or like communities." See Anderson & Krause, supra note 102, at i61.
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hours and conditions of employment of other employees performing
similar services and with other employees generally:
(i) In public employment in comparable communities.
(ii) In private employment in comparable communities.
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly
known as the cost of living.
(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, in-
cluding direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other ex-
cused time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization
benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other
benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency
of the arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are nor-
mally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of
wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collec-
tive bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise be-
tween the parties, in the public service or in private employment."'
By following these statutory criteria, courts have held that this compre-
hensive list of factors "provides the necessary standards" required "for
the exercise of legislative power."'49
Finally, the last required safeguard is judicial review of the arbitra-
tion award. If California's cities and counties adopt the proposed voter
approval system, then judicial review will not be required. The voters,
not the arbitrator, will have the ultimate review. However, in other forms
of binding arbitration statutes, where voters do not "review" the deci-
sion, judicial review is essential. Typically, the arbitrator's award, which
should be in writing, is subject to judicial review for "abuse of discretion,
fraud, or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator."5 ° This judicial review,
while limited, ensures that the arbitrator is acting in accordance with the
law and in accordance with the enumerated criteria.'' The standard of
judicial review of interest arbitration awards is much stricter than most
arbitration awards, including grievance arbitration.'52
148. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239 (West 2001); see also City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Offi-
cers Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 68, 81-82 (Mich. I98o).
149. Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge No. i v. City of Commerce City, 996 P.2d at 139.
i50. Municipality of Anchorage v. Anchorage Dep't of Employees Ass'n, 839 P.2d Io8o, 1o88
(Alaska i992).
151. For an excellent analysis of the role of judicial review in both pre- and post- interest arbitra-
tion award enforcement, see Craver, supra note 28, at 568-77. See also Grodin, supra note 2, at 697-
700.
152. See Craver, supra note 28, at 57I.
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As stated earlier, written decisions, enumerated standards, and judi-
cial review are important, but, with direct political accountability, they
become less so. That is because the citizens of the community have the
final "review." Therefore, while these standards are important in con-
straining arbitrator discretion, direct political accountability provides an
additional safeguard against any troublesome delegation problem.
CONCLUSION
Binding interest arbitration has become a popular tool in many
states and localities for resolving potentially debilitating strikes.' 3 Al-
though California's statewide venture into binding interest arbitration
has failed, there remain several avenues by which California public enti-
ties can enact binding interest arbitration legislation. Many legislatures
on the state and local level have drafted comprehensive statutes not only
to resolve the labor dispute problem, but to ensure that the delegation of
this legislative authority is constitutionally permissible. Until recently,
state courts had unanimously upheld these statutes. The upholding of
these provisions was a positive trend, in light of the carefully crafted
statutes.
The State of California and its cities and counties should adopt a
statute or ordinance that the limits binding arbitration to "essential" em-
ployees and provides a list of enumerated statutory standards that an ar-
bitrator is to consider. The best way to obtain political accountability is
through a direct election by the voters on whether to approve or reject
the arbitration award. That way, the arbitration award is truly politically
accountable and is the message of the citizens who will have to pay, di-
rectly or indirectly, for the new labor contracts.
153. Stuart S. Mukamal, Unilateral Employer Action Under Public-Sector Binding Interest Arbitra-
tion, 6 J.L. & COM. 107, io7 (1986).
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